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DEFILING THE DEAD: 
NECROPHILIA AND THE LAW 
TYLER TRENT OCHOA· 
CHRISTINE NEWMAN JONES·· 
I. INTRODUcnON 
On September 19, 1995, two men allegedly broke into the mortu­
ary at Forest Lawn Memorial Park in Hollywood Hills and engaged in 
sexual intercourse with two female corpses. The next day, police an­
nounced the two men were being held on suspicion of burglary. I 
According to police, the two men were not charged with having 
intercourse with a corpse because having sex with a corpse is not ille­
gal in California.2 This left the men liable only on charges that they 
broke into the mortuary and stole computer chips from a personal com­
puter in the building.3 
Notwithstanding the value of the property stolen from the mortu­
ary, it seems wholly inadequate to charge individuals who engage in 
acts of necrophilia merely with suspicion of burglary or some other 
incidental crime. That society would be outraged by acts of necrophilia 
seems obvious. That there is no prohibition against such acts is baf­
fling. 
This article will examine the issue of criminal liability for necro­
philia.4 Part II will address necrophilia in general and will discuss 
* Assistant Professor, Whittier Law School. J.D., Stanford University ( 1987), A.B., 
Stanford University (1983). 
** Whittier Law School, Class of 1997. B.S., Auburn University (1989). 
At the request of the authors, parallel citations to the official California reporters have 
been added for the benefit of practitions. 
1 .  Frank B. Williams, Two Valley Men Arrested in Sex Assault on Corpse, Los AN-
GELES TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at B5. 
2. [d. 
3. [d. 
4. Whether civil liability may be imposed for acts of necrophilia is beyond the scope 
5 39 
HeinOnline -- 18 Whittier L. Rev. 540 1996-1997
S40 WlllTTIER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18  
briefly why society fmds such acts reprehensible. Part ill will discuss 
existing criminal prohibitions against necrophilia in California and 
other states. Part N will discuss the evidentiary use of necrophilia in 
proving other crimes. Finally, Part V will evaluate proposed legislation 
outlawing necrophilia. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. NECROPHIUA DEFINED 
Necrophilia is defined as a sick abnormal fascination with death 
and the dead; or more particularly, an erotic attraction to corpses.s 
Necrophilia is a psychosexual disorder and is categorized with the 
group of disorders which comprise the paraphilias, a subtype of psy­
chosexual disorder involving unusual or bizarre fantasies or acts that 
are necessary for full sexual excitement.6 In all, there are eight named 
paraphilias listed in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("The Manual"),' including 
pedophilia (the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activity with prepu­
bescent children), exhibitionism (repetitive acts of exposing the genitals 
for the purpose of achieving sexual excitement), and sexual masochism 
(sexual arousal attained through being humiliated, bound, beaten, or 
otherwise made to suffer).8 In addition to the eight named paraphilias, 
there is a group of "Not Otherwise Specified" paraphilias,9 which in-
of this article. Although the possibility presents some interesting theoretical issues, there is 
only one reported appellate opinion addressing the question of civil liability for necrophilia. 
See Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982) 
(holding that mortuary had a duty of care to the decedent's husband to protect the 
decedent's body from sexual assault by a third party who entered the defendant's chapel 
through an unlocked door). At least one other such case resulted in a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff. See Gonzalez v. Sacramento Memorial Lawn, No. 286770 (Cal. Super. Cl Apr. 21, 
1982), described in 25 ATLA L. Rep. 348 (Oct. 1982) (discussed in note 23, infra). 
5. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICfIONARY 950 (2d ed. 1970). 
6. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 522-23 (4th ed. 1994). 
7. Id. 
8. The other five named paraphilias are: fetishism (use of nonliving objects); 
frotteurism (touching or rubbing against a nonconsenting person); sexual sadism (deriving­
sexual excitement from psychological or physical suffering of the victim); transvestic fetish­
ism (cross-dressing); and voyeurism (observing unsuspecting individuals who are naked or 
engaging in sexual activity). Id. at 525-32. 
9. Id. at 532. The "Not Otherwise Specified" category is included in the Manual for 
coding paraphilias that do not meet the criteria for any of the named paraphilia categories. 
Id. 
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cludes necrophilia along with such disorders as telephone scatologia 
(obscene phone calls), zoophilia (animals), coprophilia (feces), klis­
maphilia (enemas), and urophilia (urine).1 0 The Manual cautions that 
paraphilias should be distinguished from the nonpathological use of 
. sexual fantasies, behaviors, or objects as stimuli for sexual excitement 
in individuals without a paraphilia. I I Fantasies, behaviors, or objects 
are paraphilic only when they lead to clinically significant distress or 
impairment, such as legal complications and interference with social 
relationships. 1 2 
Necrophilia also has been characterized as an "eligibility paraphil­
ia,"13 that is, one in which self-abandonment to the ecstasy of the sin­
ful act of lust can be achieved only if the partner qualifies as "eligible" 
by being beyond the limits, privileges, and protection of being 
undefilable.1 4  Necrophilia is the ultimate eligibility paraphilia, IS be­
cause the partner has "no power to resist, and [is] therefore capable of 
being absolutely subjugated.,,16 Necrophilia is viewed as a "blatant 
psychosis" in the opinion of some psychiatrists.17 Not everyone who 
engages in necrophilic acts can be termed a necrophile, however, be­
cause the paraphilias are measured by behavior which is addictively 
repetitious and compulsive, characteristics which may be missing in in­
dividuals who engage in necrophilia as a result of rage, experimenta­
tion or lust rather than sexual necessity or habit. 1 8 
While actual necrophilia is comparatively rare, less severe forms 
are not infrequent.1 9 Equivalents are fantasies or situations where the 
other person is drugged, asleep, or is asked to assume a passive, inert 
role in sexual intercourse, especially in a coffm.20 Necrophilia allows 
destructive urges toward the sexual partner, and fear of retaliation for 
10. [d. 
11. [d. at 525. 
12. [d. 
13. JOHN MONEY, VENUSES PENuSES: SEXOLOOY, SEXOSOPHY, AND ExIGENCY THEoRY 
445-46 (1986). 
14. [d. 
15. [d. at 446. 
16. WILLIAM B. ARNDT, JR., GENDER DISORDERS AND THE PARAPHlLIAS 331 (1991). A 
case study cited by Arndt quotes a necrophile as saying "[ilf they were dead they could not 
object to my company and my behavior . . . .  If you were dead, I could kiss and hug you 
as much as I liked, and you could not refuse." [d. 
17. People v. Clark, 3 Cal. 4th 41, 153, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 617, 833 P.2d 561, 624 
(1992). 
18. MONEY, supra note 13, at 446. 
19. ARNDT, supra note 16, at 330. 
20. [d. at 331. 
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those wishes, to be controlled because the partner, being o r  playing 
dead, is already destroyed and cannot strike back.21 The inert partner 
creates a sense of power because the dead body is unable to attack or 
abandon the necrophile which provides relief from feelings of inad­
equacy and a heightened sense of control. 22 
Although necrophilia is primarily engaged in by males, occasional':' 
ly there have been reported instances of female necrophilia.23 
B. WHY SOCIErr VALUES THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD 
All societies of which there is any record have had customs con­
cerning respect for corpses and the treatment of the bodies of the 
dead.2 4 Sometimes these customs are central to the basic values and 
symbols of a culture, like the Egyptian pyramids, mummies, and the 
Book of the Dead.2S Sometimes the customs are based on rules con­
cerning the treatment of human remains.26 Regardless, funeral customs 
throughout the world share one factor common to all: the assumption 
that the dead person has not yet ceased to live.27 
Our own culture has rules governing the treatment of corpses, 
21. [d. 
22. [d. at 332. 
23. In Gonzalez v. Sacramento Memorial Lawn, No. 286770 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 
1982), an unreported trial court decision, a 21-year-old female employee of the mortuary 
admitted to committing 20 to 40 acts of necrophilia before stealing the body of the 
plaintiff's son. The mortuary was held liable for negligence in hiring, retaining and super­
vising the employee, who had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and had been 
admitted to a state mental hospital for 22 months where she was raped by a male attendant. 
"This apparently was the first case of female necrophilia in the annals of sexual aberrancy." 
25 ATLA L. Rep. 348, 348 (Oct. 1982) (summarizing the Gonzalez case). See also State v. 
Walters, 514 So. 2d 257, 261-62 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (describing acts of necrophilia engaged 
in by defendant and her lover with the bodies of two murder victims). 
24. THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 105 (1983). 
25. [d. 
26. [d. 
27. WIlliAM HENRy FRANCIS BASEVI, THE BURIAL OF THE DEAD 1 (E.P. Dutton and 
Co. 1920): 
Everywhere we fmd this indicated, in tradition and practice, among races far asun­
der the culture, space, and time, whose manners and ceremonies have little else in 
common. In or near the grave are placed food, clothes, and weapons; while the 
body is protected from molestation often most elaborately. All this provision con­
veys the idea that there is something more in burial than the disposal of a dead 
man's bones. It is all so eminently practical, though so ill-timed, and so exclusively 
concerned with material needs-with a strange insistency, as though fearful that we 
might forget or fail to understand-that it is dealing with a living person. 
[d. at 1-2. 
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including many enforced by law, which are based primarily on wide­
spread horror at corpse desecration.28 "In our society, we treat the 
dead with dignity and respect"; violation of that respect "goes against 
the basic mores of society" and "cause[s] great suffering to the surviv­
ing families of the deceased.,,29 Some have argued that such rules may 
not be all that different in kind from the cultural prohibition of deviant 
sexual practices that have traditionally been called perverted and un­
natural.30 These sexual prohibitions typically have as their justification 
widespread disgust of the prohibited acts.3) 
If it is true that our culture determines its treatment of the dead 
the same way it determines its reaction to unusual sexual practices, by 
some sort of societal trepidation meter, then it is important to inquire 
whether emotion, however intense, can support coercive law.32 Cer­
tainly scholars generally would be dissatisfied with such an emotional 
method of legislating. Unlike other deviant sexual behaviors, however, 
necrophilia also violates other cultural norms which traditionally have 
been considered less subjective, such as requiring consent, protecting 
ownership of personal property , and protecting public health and safety. 
The presence of these additional concerns, therefore, makes it appropri­
ate to impose criminal liability for acts of necrophilia. The next section 
will discuss the extent to which acts of necrophilia are already subject 
to such liability. 
ID. CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
A. CRIMINAL LIABIUTY IN CALIFORNIA 
1. Health and Safety Code 
There is currently no statute in California specifically outlawing 
necrophilia. The California Health and Safety Code contains several 
provisions concerning the protection of dead bodies in general, but it is 
unclear whether these code sections provide dead bodies protection 
from sexual assaults. 
Health and Safety Code section 7052 provides: "Every person who 
willfully mutilates, disinters, or removes from the place of interment 
28. GREY, supra note 24, at 105. See also discussion of criminal laws infra part III. 
29. State v. Ryan, 899 P.2d 825, 828 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 995). 
30. GREY, supra note 24, at 105. 
31 .  Id. 
32. Id. 
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any human remains, without authority of law, i s  guilty of a felony.'033 
The California Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the language 
"willfully mutilates" could be construed to include the damage done to 
a dead body during intercourse.34 Other case law, however, holds that 
"[t]he term 'mutilate,' as applied to a person, means to cut off a limb 
or an essential part of the body, and in criminal law means to deprive a 
person of the use of those limbs which may be useful in fight.',3s Sub­
sequent legislative history36 and cases from other jurisdictions37 con­
cur with the latter defmition. The sort of damage done to a corpse dur­
ing intercourse, especially that which is specifically attributable to the 
act of intercourse itself, typically will not result in the removal of a 
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West Supp. 1997). 
34. See People v. Stanworth. 11 Cal. 3d 588, 604 n.15, 114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 262 n.15, 
522 P.2d 1058, 1070 n.15 (1974) (although the crime of rape requires a live victim, 
"[nJevertheless, dead bodies are not without protection; . . . In protecting the physical integ­
rity of a dead body, section 7052 of the Heath and Safety Code makes it a felony to mu­
tilate, disinter or remove from the place of interment 'any human remains without authority 
of law . . . .. "); People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1176 n.3, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 297 n.3, 
91 P.2d 965, 976 n.3 (1990) (noting that the Model Penal Code has an abuse of corpse 
provision covering sexual contact with a dead body, and that "California has a comparable 
statute punishing mutilation of a dead body."). 
35. See People v. Bullington, 27 Cal. App. 2d 396, 400, 80 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1938) 
(quoting State v. Cody, 23 P. 891, 896 (Or. 1890» (holding that the removal of two gold 
crowns from the teeth of a dead body was not a "mutilation" of the body within the mean­
ing of a statute making it a felony to mutilate a dead body). The statute at issue in 
Bullington was former Cal. Penal Code § 290, which was later superseded by Health & 
Safety Code § 7052. See 1939 Cal. Stat 1000, c. 60, § 40000. 
36. See infra note 41. 
37. See, e.g., Holloman v. State, 656 So. 2d 1134, 1139 (Miss. 1995) (defIning mutilate 
as "[to] deprive a person of the use of any limb of his body or to cut off or permanently 
destroy or cripple or to radically alter as to make imperfect."); Parker v. State, 849 P.2d 
1062, 1069 (Nev. 1993) (defIning mutilate as "to cut off or permanently destroy a limb or 
essential part of the body, or to cut off or alter radically so as to make imperfect."); Elliott 
v. James Patrick Hauling, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (same). See also 
BLACK'S LAW DICI10NARY 1020 (6th ed. 1990) ("In criminal law, the depriving a man of 
the use of any of those limbs which may be useful to. him in fIght, the loss of which 
amounts to mayhem.") (citing Bullington); id. at 979 (defIning "mayhem" as the removal, 
dismemberment, disablement or permanent disfIgurement of some bodily member); but see 
Comment, Criminal Law: Mutilation of a Dead Body, 27 CAL. L. REv. 217 (1939) (criticiz­
ing Bullington). Compare Kirby v. State, 272 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) ("'cuts 
or mutilates' as used in the statute requires proof of an act of greater severity than a mere 
nick with a knife."); Washington v. City of Columbus, 222 S.E.2d 583, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1975) (four puncture marks the size of a matchstem or a toothpick "simply does not consti­
tute mutilation as a matter of law.") with State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Ariz. 
1994) (mutilation includes post-mortem stab wounds and carving of word "Bonzai" in 
victim's back); Allinger v. Kell, 302 N.W.2d 576, 577-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (removing 
hands and hair of corpse constituted mutilation). 
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limb or an essential part of the body. Under this interpretation, there­
fore, most acts of necrophilia would not be prohibited by section 7050. 
Another section of the Health and Safety Code provides: "Every 
person who knowingly mutilates or disinters, wantonly disturbs, or 
wilfully removes any human remains in or from any location other than 
a dedicated cemetery without the authority of law is guilty of a misde­
meanor.,,38 Again, the language "knowingly mutilates or .. . wantonly 
disturbs" could be construed to include intercourse with dead bodies. 
However, in enacting this section, the California Legislature specifical­
ly stated that the purpose of this section was to protect Native Ameri­
can burial grounds.39 Given this purpose, it is difficult to believe that 
the California Legislature intended the crime of removing human re­
mains from a location other than a dedicated cemetery to include com­
mitting sexual acts with corpses. Moreover, even if this section of the 
statute was construed to include intercourse with a corpse, it would 
only apply to acts committed on land other than a dedicated cemetery. 
This section of the Health and Safety Code, therefore, provides little or 
no assistance in making acts of necrophilia unlawful. 
Division 7 of the Health and Safety Code contains several sections 
concerning the disposal of unclaimed dead bodies. Section 7208 pro­
vides that: "Every person who unlawfully disposes, uses, or sells the 
body of an unclaimed dead person, or who violates any provision of 
this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.,,40 If courts construe the term 
"uses" to include intercourse, this section would protect unclaimed 
dead bodies from acts of necrophilia. This section would not protect 
identified or claimed corpses, however, nor would it provide felony 
liability for those who engage in acts of necrophilia. 
2. Penal Code 
Only one provision in the California Penal Code specifically pro­
vides protection for dead bodies. Penal Code section 642 makes it 
unlawful to remove any articles of value from dead bodies. 41 On its 
38. CAL. HEALTH & sAFETY CODE § 7050.5 (West Supp. 1992). 
39. See 1982 Cal. Stat 5777, c. 1492, § 1 (b): 
The purpose of this act is: (1) To provide protection to Native American human 
burials and skeletal remains from vandalism and inadvertent destruction. (2) To 
provide a regular means by which Native American descendants can make known 
their concerns regarding the need for sensitive treatment and disposition of Native 
American burials, skeletal remains, and items associated with Native American buri­
als. 
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7208 (West 1970). 
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 642 (West 1970): 
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face, this section only addresses removal of property from a dead body 
and not protection of the body itself; thus, it cannot be construed to 
prohibit committing sexual acts with corpses. 
In the absence of a specific statute prohibiting necrophilia, some 
prosecutors have attempted to charge defendants who engage in acts of 
necrophilia with rape. The Penal Code defmes rape as "an act of sexual 
intercourse accomplished with a person . . .  against [the] person's 
Will. " 42 The pertinent legal issue, therefore, is whether a dead body is 
a "person " within the meaning of the statute. 
The California Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether a 
dead body is a person in People v. Kelly. 43 The defendant in Kelly 
was convicted of the murder and attempted rape of one victim, and the 
murder, rape and robbery of a second victim. 44 At trial, the defense 
contended that the defendant fIrst acquired the intent to have inter­
course with the victims after they were already dead. 45 The defense 
apparently raised this theory not only to argue that the defendant was 
not guilty of rape or attempted rape, but also to negate the 
prosecution's reliance on those charges as a predicate for felony mur­
der46 and as a predicate for a finding of special circumstances warrant­
ing imposition of the death penalty. 47 Over a defense objection, how­
ever, the trial court gave the following nonstandard instruction to the 
jury: "It is legally possible to rape a dead body. Where a defendant 
attempts to coerce his victim into intercourse with him, fails to accom­
plish the purPose while she is alive and kills her to satisfy his desire 
Every person who willfully and maliciously removes and keeps possession of and 
appropriates for his own use articles of value from a dead human body, the theft 
of which articles would be petty theft is gUilty of a misdemeanor, or if the theft of 
the articles would be grand theft, a felony. 
This statute was enacted one year after the decision in Bullington. See note 35 and accom­
panying text; 1939 Cal. Stat. 2209, c. 691 § 1. One can infer that this statute was intended 
to criminalize the conduct that occurred in Bullington. Significantly, however, the Legislature 
did not change or overrule the defmition of "mutilate" contained in Bullington. 
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (a)(2). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(6) & (7) 
("against the victim's will"). 
43. 1 Cal. 4th 495, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 822 P.2d 385 (1992). 
44. [d. at 512, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683, 822 P.2d at 391. 
45. [d. at 524, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691, 822 P.2d at 399. 
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (defming felony murder as including a killing "com­
mitted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . rape."). 
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(iii) (Special circumstances include murder 
"committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, 
[or] attempted commission of' a rape.). 
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with her corpse, the killing falls within the felony murder rule.'t48 
The California Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the 
fIrst sentence of the trial court's instruction was erroneous and required 
reduction of the defendant's rape conviction to attempted rape, stating 
unequivocally that "[r]ape requires a live victim."49 The court ex-
plained: 
. 
Rape must be accomplished with a person, not a dead body. It must 
be accomplished against a person's will. A dead body cannot con­
sent to or protest a rape, nor can it be in fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury [as required by Cal. Penal Code section 261 ,  
subdivision (2)] . Penal Code section 26 3 provides, '[t]he essential 
guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the 
victim of the rape ... . '  A dead body has no feelings of outrage.50 
However, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that this error 
invalidated the defendant's convictions for murder and the fmdings of 
special circumstances, saying: "A person who attempts to rape a live 
victim, kills the victim in the attempt, then has intercourse with the 
body, has committed only attempted rape, not actual rape, but is guilty 
of felony murder and is subject to the rape special circumstance.',SI 
The Court concluded that it was unlikely that the fIrst sentence of the 
challenged jury instruction, although erroneous, had misled the jury as 
to the requirements of the felony murder rule, saying: 
A reasonable juror would have understood that for the felony-murder 
rule and the special circumstance to apply, the defendant must have 
been attempting to rape the victim at the time of the killing; it would 
not suffice, if. after the killing, defendant acquired the intent to have 
intercourse with the dead body. The second sentence of the chal­
lenged instruction, which clearly was intended to explain the fIrst, 
48. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 524, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691, 822 P.2d at 399. 
49. [d. 
50. [d., quoting People v. Sellers, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 1050, 250 Cal. Rptr. 345, 
350 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also People v. Davis, 10 Cal. 4th 463, 521 n.20, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 826, 858 n.20, 896 P.2d 119, 151 n.20 (1995) ("As a matter of law, a rape or 
sodomy cannot occur if the victim is deceased."); People v. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588, 604 
n.l5, 114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 262 n.l 5, 522 P.2d 1058, 1070 n.l5 (1974) ("It is manifest that 
the 'feelings' of a female cannot be offended nor does the victim suffer 'outrage' where she 
is dead when sexual penetration has occurred. Thus it appears that a female must be alive at 
the moment of penetration in order to support a conviction of rape under section 261.") 
(dictum). 
51. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 525, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692, 822 P.2d at 400. Accord, People 
v. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588, 604 n.15, 114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 262 n.15, 522 P.2d 1058, 1070 
n.l5; People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 838, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421, 429, 452 P.2d 637, 645 
(1969); People v. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d ISS, 158, 37 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619, 390 P.2d 393, 395 
(1964). 
HeinOnline -- 18 Whittier L. Rev. 548 1996-1997
548 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18  
correctly stated the rule.52 
In so holding, the Court distinguished People v. Sellers,s3 in which the 
defendant's conviction for felony murder was reversed where the de­
fendant killed the victim and left her apartment, but returned to the 
scene after an hour or two and had intercourse with the victim's dead 
body.s4 
Analogizing to the cases interpreting the rape statute, the Califor­
nia Supreme Court has also held that a defendant cannot be convicted 
of sodomy unless the victim is alive at the time of penetration. ss 
One year after Kelly, in People v. Thompson,56 the Court of Ap­
peal considered whether "the doctrine of legal impossibility precludes a 
conviction for attempted rape where the victim is not alive at the time 
of the attempt."S7 In Thompson, the defendant testified at trial that af­
ter he fmished stabbing the victim, he picked her up from the floor and 
placed her on the bed, and while he did not know if she was alive or 
dead, he decided to rape her anyway. S8 On appeal, the Thompson court 
concluded that "there is no requirement that the victim be alive for 
purposes of an attempted rape."S9 The court explained: 
52. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 526, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692, 822 P.2d at 400; see also id. at 
527 n.8, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 n.8, 822 P.2d at 401 n.8 ("Defense counsel argued that no 
sexual intent arose until after death (which, if believed, would have avoided the felony-mur­
der rule and the special circumstance) . . . .  "). 
53. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 250 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1988). 
54. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th at 527, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693, 822 P.2d at 401. 
55. People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1176, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 297, 791 P.2d 965, 
976 (1990): 
Although we have found no case that discusses the question of whether the offense 
of sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the time of penetration, with respect 
to the analogous crime of rape, the California authorities uniformly hold that the 
victim 'must be alive at the moment of penetration in order to support a conviction 
of rape . .. .' . 
. . . Because the sodomy statute, like the rape statute, defmes the crime as 
sexual contact with another 'person' rather than with a 'body,' we conclude that the 
offense of sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the time of penetration. 
See also People v. Davis, 10 Cal. 4th 463, 521 n.20, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 858 n.20, 896 
P.2d 119, 151 n.20 (1995): 
If you should fmd that no anal penetration occurred until after death, the defendant 
cannot be found guilty of forcible sodomy, but could be found guilty of the lesser 
included offense of attempted sodomy if the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant attempted an act of forcible sodomy while the victim was 
still alive. 
56. 12 Cal. App. 4th 195, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333 (1993). 
57. [d. at 201, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. 
58. [d. at 200-01, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. 
59. [d. at 201, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. 
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It is undisputed that the crime of rape requires a live victim, because 
it requires non-consensual sexual intercourse. [People v. Kelly, 822 
P.2d at 385.] It is also clear that in order to be guilty of attempted 
rape, a defendant must intend to rape a live victim. [ [d.] If  defendant 
intends at all times to have sexual intercourse with a dead body, the 
defendant can be guilty of neither rape nor attempted rape. The 
question remains as to whether a defendant may be guilty of at­
tempted rape when the def�ndant intends to have non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with a live victinibut unbeknownst to the defen­
dant, the victim is dead . 
. . . If an individual attempts to rape a victim, reasonably be­
lieving the victim is alive, the act as intended and envisaged by the 
actor constitutes the substantive crime of rape. Accordingly, if unbe­
knownst to the individual the victim is not in fact alive, the indi­
vidual is nevertheless guilty of attempted rape. On the other hand, if 
an individual intends to have sexual intercourse with a dead body, 
the acts as envisaged do not . constitute the substantive crime of rape 
and the individual cannot be guilty of attempted rape.60 
5 49 
Thus, under Kelly and Thompson, whether defendant can· be 
charged with attempted rape depends on whether the defendant be­
lieved the victim was alive at the time he initially attempted to have 
intercourse with the victim. If the defendant believed the victim was 
alive at that time, the defendant may be guilty of attempted rape. On 
the other hand, "[iJf defendant intends at all times to have sexual inter­
course with a dead body, the defendant can be guilty of neither rape 
nor attempted rape.'t61 In such a case, the �efendant would not be held 
criminally liable at all for his sexual acts with the dead body of the 
victim. This apparent injustice is even more offensive where, as in the 
Forest Lawn incident,62 th� individuals who engage in acts of necro­
philia are not responsible for the death of the person whose body is 
violated, leaving them liable only for any incidental property crimes 
such as burglary and trespassing. 
The fact that involvement in the death of the victim is necessary 
in order for the defendant to be criminally liable for acts of. necrophilia 
demonstrates a need 'for separate criminal liability for the necrophilic 
acts themselves.63 It is therefore appropriate to consider the criminal 
60. [d. at 201-03, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-37. 
61. Thompson, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 201-02, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. 
62. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text 
63. One prosecutor interviewed by the authors, however, suggested the argument could 
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treatment of necrophilia in other states. 
B. CRIMINAL LIABIUTY IN OTHER STATES 
Other states take a variety of approaches to the issue of criminal 
liability for acts of necrophilia, which may be grouped into three cate­
gories: (1) judicial interpretation of rape and sodomy statutes to include 
intercourse with dead bodies;64 (2) judicial interpretation of abuse of 
corpse statutes to include intercourse with dead bodies;65 and (3) ex­
press statutory bans on intercourse with dead bodies.66 Each of these 
approaches will be discussed in turn. 
1. Rape and Sodomy 
As noted above, California courts have held that intercourse with a 
dead body does not constitute the crime of rape, and that it constitutes 
the crime of attempted rape only if the perpetrator was unaware at the 
time that the victim was dead.67 Courts in other jurisdictions have split 
on the issue of whether the crime of rape includes intercourse with a 
dead body. 68 
. 
Michigan is typical of those jurisdictions that have held that sexual 
intercourse with a dead body is not prohibited under a general rape 
statute. In People v. Hutner,69 the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated 
the defendant's felony-murder conviction, holding that "the crime of 
criminal sexual conduct requires a live victim at the time of penetra­
tion.,,70 The court explained: 
Our statute . . .  defines third-degree criminal sexual conduct as en­
gaging in nonconsensual sexual penetration with another "person." 
Furthermore, a "victim" is a "person alleging to have been subjected 
to criminal sexual conduct." A dead body is not a person. It cannot 
allege anything. A dead body has no will to overcome. It does not 
be made that intercourse with a dead body could be viewed as a victimless crime (i.e., a 
dead body is not a victim) and therefore the lack of criminal liability is appropriate, not 
erroneous. Interview with Randall J. Baron, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles County 
District Attorney's Office, in Los Angeles (Oct. 23, 1995). 
64. See notes 67-114 and accompanying text. 
65. See notes 115-132 and accompanying text. 
66. See notes 133-156 and accompanying text. 
67. See notes 42-62 and accompanying text. 
68. See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Fact that Murder-Rape Victim was 
Dead at Time of Penetration ·as Affecting Conviction for Rape, 76 A.L.R.4th 1147 (1990). 
69. 530 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
70. Id. at 176. 
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have the same potential to suffer physically or mentally as a live or 
even an unconscious or dying victim.'1 
The court noted that "murdering a person in order to sexually assault 
that person's dead body " might support a conviction of ftrst-degree 
premeditated murder,72 and that "[a] felony murder conviction may 
also be sustained where the victim dies during the attempt to perpetrate 
the underlying crime,"73 but it held that the evidence in the record was 
"simply insufftcient to conclude that defendant killed the victim in the 
course of an attempt to rape her.,,7 4  Nonetheless, the court afftrmed 
the trial court's conviction on the lesser-included offense of second­
degree murder and remanded the case for re-sentencing.75 The court 
also invited the Legislature to correct the problem by enacting a statute 
prohibiting necrophilia.76 
Other jurisdictions holding that the crime of rape requires that the 
victim be alive at the time of intercourse include Alabama," Kan­
sas,78 Kentucky,79 Oklahoma,so Nevada,81 Pennsylvania,82 Wiscon-
71. [d. 
72. [d . . at 176-77. 
73. [d. at 177. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 176 n. l ("This state appears to have no statute that specifically proscribes 
necrophilia. This is an issue that our Legislature may wish to address."). 
77. See Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78, 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) 
If the intent to have sexual intercourse arose after the victim was already dead, 
there could be no forcible compulsion of the victim to engage in sexual intercourse, 
thus, although the appellant's act was offensive and repugnant, it could not be rape. 
We could find no Alabama authority for this holding, however, courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that a corpse cannot be raped. 
(citations omitted). The court's reference to the time the "intent" was formed should not be 
read as indicating agreement with the Georgia view that the victim need only be alive at the 
time the assault commenced, and not at the time of penetration. Instead, it should be read in 
conjunction with the court's holding that the defendant could be found guilty of capital 
murder if the killing occurred during the commission of an attempted rape. See id. ("Similar­
Iy, if the jury found that the victim formed the intent to rape the victim while he was kill­
ing her, and then had sex with her even though she was dead, he is still gUilty of murder 
while committing the underlying offense."). The Alabama statute defines "during" as "in the 
course of or in connection with the commission of . . . the underlying felony or anempt 
thereof" Ala. Code § 13A-5-39(2) (1975) (emphasis added). 
78. See State v. Perkins, 811 P.2d 1142, 1150 (Kan. 1991) ("Rape can only be commit­
ted against a living person."). 
79. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 722 S.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Ky. 1987) ("The 1974 
Commentary to Chapter 510 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes states that sexual intercourse 
with a dead body is not penalized as rape, but the· offense is prohibited by the abuse of 
corpse statute, KRS 525.120.") (dictum); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 549-
550 (Ky. 1988) (holding that if there was any substantial evidence on retrial that the victim 
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sin,83 and federal cases interpreting Texas law8 4 and the Unifonn 
Code of Military Justice.8s This view, however, does not exclude the 
possibility that the defendant may be convicted of attempted rape if he 
was unaware that the victim was dead.86 
Four states have held that the victim need only be alive at the time 
the assault commenced, and that the defendant may be convicted of 
rape (and not merely attempted rape) even if penetration occurred after 
death. The leading case for this view is Lipham v. State,87 in which 
was dead at the time of the alleged rape and sodomy, defendant was entitled to a jury in· 
struction on the lesser charge of abuse of corpse). Given the subsequent opinion in Sanborn, 
the court's additional statement in Smith that "[tlhe Commonwealth does not bear the burden 
of proving that a rape victim was alive when penetration occurred," 722 S.W.2d at 894, 
should be read to mean either that death of the victim is an afftrnlative defense to rape, or 
that such proof was unnecessary because of the court's holding that the defendant had failed 
to preserve the issue for appeal. 
80. See Rogers v. State, 890 P.2d 959, 969 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("the jury was in­
formed that rape required a living person."); id. at 969 n. 13 ("The State did erroneously 
argue that Rogers raped Lauffenburger after she was dead."). 
81. See Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 914 (Nev. 1996) ("Although Nevada's sexual as­
sault statute provides little guidance in this regard, we conclude that the better reasoned in­
terpretation is that the legislature intended "person" in the rape statute to mean a living 
human being."); accord, Atkins v. State, 923 P.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Nev. 1996). 
82. Commonwealth v. Sudler, 436 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Pa. 1981) (holding that "penetration 
after a victim's death is not within the definition of rape."). Three justices dissented, express­
ing the view that intercourse committed immediately after a murder was sufficient to support 
a conviction for rape. [d. at 1381-83 (dissenting opinions of Nix, joined by Kaufman, and 
Larsen, joined by Kaufman). The majority, however, believed that the enactment of an abuse 
of corpse statute based on the Model Penal Code (see notes 115-119 and accompanying text) 
indicated that "the Legislature intended the crime' of rape to encompass only indignities to 
the living." [d. at 1379. 
83. State v. Holt, 382 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Wis. 1985) ("The state agrees that sexual 
intercourse with a dead body does not violate Wisconsin's sexual assault laws," but conclud­
ing that "in a rape-murder case where the exact sequence of events cannot be proved, the 
jury may reasonably infer . . . that the victim was alive during the sexual assault, at least in 
the absence of evidence of necrophilic tendencies on the part of the accused."). 
84. See United States v. Anderson, 36 M.J. 963, 979 (A.F.C.M.A. 1993) (''Trial counsel 
noted that rape of a spouse is no crime under either the UCMJ or Texas law, and the gov­
ernment adds on appeal that neither is necrophilia.") (dictum). 
85. See Anderson, supra note 84; United States v. Thomas, 13 C.M.A. 278, 281, 286, 
32 C.M.R. 278, 281, 286 (1962) (approving instruction that to fmd the accused guilty of 
rape, "it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was alive at the time of 
the alleged acts."). 
86. See Thomas, 13 C.M.A. at 281, 286, 32 C.M.R. at 281, 286 (approving instruction 
under Uniform Code of Military Justice that there is no requirement that the victim be alive 
to find the accused guilty of attempted rape). In Thomas, two servicemen were convicted of 
attempting to rape a woman whom they believed to be unconscious from intoxication, but 
who was in fact already dead. [d. at 280, 32 C.M.R. at 280. 
87. 364 S.E.2d 840 (Ga. 1988). 
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the Georgia Supreme Court said: 
There is nothing in this code section which precludes a finding of 
rape if the victim is not alive at the moment of pene tration. . . . 
. .. H the element of force is satisfied where the vic tim has 
used less than deadly force to overcome the victim's resistance so as 
to allow him to have carnal knowledge of the victim, the element of 
force is surely no less satisfied when the defendant has used deadly 
force to accomplish his aim. 
As for the remaining element, "against her will" has been inter­
preted to mean "without her consent," and has been satisfied in cases 
in which the victim was drugged, asleep, unconscious, or in a coma. 
We see no reason why it should be any less applicable in a case in 
which the defendant has rendered the victim pennanently uncon­
scious by killing her.88 
55 3 
Unlike many jurisdictions, Georgia has a statute specifically prohibiting 
necrophilia.89 The Lipham court, however, distinguished rape of a 
murder victim from acts of necrophilia committed by one who was not 
responsible for the death of the victim: 
The facts here differ fundamentally from a case in which one hap­
pens upon a corpse of a female and engages in sexual intercourse 
with it. The use of force in the fonner and the absence of force in 
the latter is the difference. One is rape and the other necrophilia, 
made a crime under OCGA § 16-6-7.90 
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Tennessee have also adopted the view that 
rape does not require a live victim when a killer sexually assaults the 
victim after her death.91 In so holding, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
88. [d. at 842-43 (citations omitted). In so ruling, the decision in Lipham superseded a 
previous federal district court opinion that suggested in dicta that rape required a live victim 
under Georgia law. See Gibson v. Jackson, 443 F. Supp. 239, 247 (M.D. Ga. 1977) ("For 
the petitioner to be guilty of rape, the victim must have been a person, a living human 
being; if dead before the act[,] as terrible and disgusting as it may bel,] the act is not 
rape."). 
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7 (1992) ("A person commits the offense of necrophilia 
when he performs any sexual act with a dead human body involving the sex organs of the 
one and the mouth, anus, penis, or vagina of the other."). Georgia's is the only state statute 
which uses the term "necrophilia" in derming the offense. 
90. 364 S.E.2d at 843. 
91. Commonwealth v. Waters, 649 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Mass. 1995) ("In the circumstances 
of one continuous event, it does not matter whether the victim's death preceded or followed 
the sexual attack."); State v. Collins, 585 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("We con­
clude that . . . the fact that the victim may have been dead when the sexual conduct oc­
curred does not, in itself, lessen defendant's culpability herein, nor does the state have to 
prove in this case, as an element of the offense of rape, that the victim was alive when 
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said: 
We are likewise unable to embrace the notion that the fortuitous 
circumstance, for the rapist, that death may have preceded penetra­
tion by an instant, negates commission of the crime of aggravated 
rape and reduces it to a relatively minor offense associated with 
erotic attraction to dead bodies. Reading the "live only" requirement 
into the statute encourages rapists to kill their victims, in our 
opinion.92 
This rationale was expressly rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court, 
which noted that a rapist who kills his victim is still subject to punish­
ment for attempted rape and felony murder.93 
Two other jUrisdictions, Florida and Louisiana, have expressed 
conflicting views on whether a defendant may be convicted of rape 
when the victim is dead. 
In 1988, the Florida Supreme Court assumed without deciding that 
rape requires a live victim.9 4 Seven years later, in Owen v. State,9S 
the Court suggested in dicta that it would adopt the Georgia view that 
. the victim need only be alive at the time the assault commenced, but 
not at the time penetration occurred.96 Two years later, in Jones v. 
State,97 the Court seemed to reverse positions again, invalidating a 
defendant's conviction for sexual battery on the ground that "[t]he 
sexual conduct occurred."); State v. Whitsell, 591 N.E.2d 265, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(following Collins); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121;  127 (Tenn. 1989) ("the aggravated rape 
statute does not require a fmding that the victim be alive at the moment of penetration."); 
State v. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tenn. 1988) (discussed below). 
92. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d at 832. 
93. Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 914 (Nev. 1996). See notes 149-152 and accompany­
ing text. 
94. McCrae v. Wainwright, 439 So. 2d 868, 871 (Fla. 1983) (''The fact that a rape may 
not have occurred because the intended victim was dead at the time of the actual penetration 
would not have changed the attacker's intent, which was properly inferable from the evi­
dence.") (emphasis added) (upholding petitioner's conviction for felony murder based on 
attempted rape). 
95. 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990). 
96. Id. at 212: 
We are satisfied that under the legislative definition a victim must be alive at the 
time the offense commences. Sexual union with a previously deceased person, as in 
a morgue, would not meet the definition of sexual battery. However, we do not be­
lieve that the legislature intended that a person who is alive at the commencement 
of the attack must be alive at the end of the attack. Here, we need not decide this 
precise issue because the jury was instructed regarding the distinction between sexu­
al battery on a live person and attempted sexual battery on a victim killed in the 
course of the crime before sexual union is achieved. The verdict of guilt on the 
sexual battery count resolves this question of fact. 
97. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990). 
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evidence here clearly establishes that the acts constituting sexual bat­
tery occurred after the victim's death.,,98 However, the Jones opinion 
cited Owen with approval,99 leaving its views on the issue unclear. 
The conflicting opinions in Jones and Owen can be explained in 
four ways. First, the Jones court may have misread Owen to mean that 
the victim must be alive at the time penetration occurs. Second, the 
Jones court may have concluded that the defendant must have believed 
the victim was alive at the time penetration occured. Third, the Jones 
court may have been of the opinion that the defendant in Jones had not 
formed the intent to have sexual intercourse until after he killed the 
victim. Fourth, the Jones court may have concluded that the conviction 
for sexual battery could be upheld only if the victim died while the 
defendant was attempting to rape her, and not if the victim was inten­
tionally killed before any attempt was made. The authors are of the 
opinion that the fourth option is most consistent with the cryptic lan­
guage in Jones, but the defmitive resolution of this issue under Florida 
law will have to await another case. 
Like Florida, the Louisiana Supreme Court has expressed conflict­
ing opinions on the issue. In 1927, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated 
in dicta that "[s]exual intercourse with the dead body of a human be­
ing, however shocking it may be, had not been made a crime."IOO 
That statement was cast into doubt by the subsequent opinion of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Eaton. 101 In Eaton, the defendant 
objected to the admission of evidence of aggravated rape in his trial for 
murder as a circumstance warranting the death penalty .102 The court 
rejected the argument, and added: 
The only real question about the rape might have been whether de­
fendant had intercourse with the victim while she was still alive or 
whether it occurred after her death . Nevertheless, the defmition of 
rape as intercourse with a "person" . . .  committed without that 
"person's" lawful consent would seem broad enough to encompass 
both situations . . . . In any event, the pathologist's testimony clearly 
established that the victim was still alive at the time defendant had 
98. [d. at 1237. 
99. [d. ("Jones's third point on appeal is that the conviction for sexual battery must be 
reversed because a victim of sexual battery must have been alive at the time of the assault 
to support the elements of the crime. We agree. See Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 2m, 212 
(Ra. 1990) (the victim must be alive at the time the offense commences)."). 
100. State v. Schmidt, 1 12 So. 400, 401 (La. 1927). 
101. 524 So. 2d 1 194 (La. 1988). 
102. [d. at 1212. 
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In a recent case, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted the conflict be­
tween Schmidt and Eaton, but found it unnecessary to resolve the is­
sue.104 
Only three states other than California have addressed the issue of 
whether acts of necrophilia may be punished under a general sodomy 
statute. In Sanborn v. Commonwealth, lOS the Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that if there was any substantial evidence on retrial to support the 
defendant's theory that the victim was already dead at the time of the 
alleged sodomy, then the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on 
the lesser offense of abuse of a corpse.I06 Kansas has also held that 
"criminal sodomy . . .  may not be committed on a dead body,"I07 and 
one Florida case has stated in dicta that ' "the abominable and detestable 
crime against nature" does not include sexual intercourse with a 
corpse. lOS Prior to 1967, Minnesota defmed "sodomy" to include 
"sexual intercourse with' a dead body."I09 In that year, however, Min­
nesota removed necrophilia and bestiality from the definition of sod­
omy and enacted a new section combining the two and reducing the 
103. Id. at 1212 n.6. 
104. See State v. Maxie, 653 So. 2d 526, 533 n.l0 (La. 1995): 
Although we fmd it unnecessary to decide whether La.R.S. 1 4:42A(1) requires the 
victim to be alive at the time of the intercourse, we note that this court has previ­
ously opined, albeit in dicta, that the definition of rape, contained in La.R.S. 14:41, 
would seem broad enough to encompass situations where the intercourse took place 
while the victim was alive or dead. State v. Eaton, 525 So. 2d 1 194, 1212 n.6 (La. 
1988). 
But see, State v. Schmidt, 112 So. 400 (La. 1927). 
105. 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) . .  
106. Id. at 549-550. 
107. State v. William, 807 P.2d 1292, 1 302 (Kan. 1991). Accord, State v. Perkins, 81 1 
P.2d 1 142, 1 150 (Kan. 1991). 
108. See McCrae v. Wainwright, 439 So. 2d 868, 871 (Fla. 1983) (emphasis added): 
We therefore conclude that there was no possibility of confusion caused by the 
reference to "the abominable and ' detestable crime against nature" . in the felony 
murder instruction. Petitioner's suggestion that the jury might have ascribed to those 
words a defmition which they have never been given by the law is b8sed upon 
speculation of the most fanciful kind. 
See also Locke v. State, 501 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tenn. Ct App. 1973) (dissenting opinion) 
(dissenting from conclusion that "crime against nature" includes cunnilingus, reasoning that 
even necrophilia, "the most loathsome, degrading and vile sexual activity imaginable," has 
not yet been legislated against in Tennessee). 
109. See former Minn. Stat. Ann. § 617.14, quoted in State v. Schwartz, 10 N.W.2d 370, 
371 (Minn. 1943); see also Advisory Committee Comment to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.293 
(West 1987). 
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penalty for both offenses. 1 10 
557 
It should be noted that regardless of which approach is taken on 
the issue of whether it is possible to rape a dead body, states have 
unanimously concluded that a person who kills the victim in the course 
of attempting to rape her may be convicted of both attempted rape and 
felony murder, regardless . of whether the victim died before actual 
penetration occurred. I I I Some courts have also held that acts of necro­
philia may be used as aggravating circumstances in a murder case war­
ranting the imposition of the death penalty.1 I2 Because punishment for 
1 10. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.294 (West 1987): 
Whoever carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality, 
which is a misdemeanor. If knowingly done in the presence of another the person 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a 
fme of not more than $3000 . or bOth. 
The Advisory Committee Note explained: 
There has been a substantial reduction in the penalty imposed. [Former] Minn.St. § 
617.14 authorizes imprisonment to a maximum of 20 years. The excessive penalty 
is believed to be more the product of revulsion to this type of crime than to the 
social harm in fact committed. . . . The recommended section increases · the penalty 
where the act occurs in the presence of another. This, it is believed, meets more 
directly the purpose of the criminal law in penalizing these reprehensible acts. 
Advisory Committee Note to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.294 (West 1987). 
I l l . State v. Gallegos, 870 P.2d 1097, l l05 (Ariz. 1 994) (holding that sufficient evi­
dence existed that penetration occurred while the victim was alive, but rejecting the argument 
that defendant's mistaken belief that the victim was dead constituted a defense); State v. 
Owen, 560 So. 2d 207, 212 (Fla. 1990) ("Here we need not decide this precise issue be­
cause the jury was instructed regarding the distinction between sexual battery on a live per­
son and attempted sexual battery on a victim killed in the course of the crime before sexual 
union is achieved."); West v. State, 553 So. 2d 8, 1 3  (Miss. 1989) (holding that a killing 
during the commission of an attempted rape may be punished as felony murder even if "the 
actual moment of the victim's death preceded consummation of the underlying felony."); 
Hines v. State, 473 A.2d 1335, 1349 (Md. Cl App. 1984) ("It is not necessary that the 
circumstances exclude the possibility that the victim was dead before any sexual touching or 
attempted rape occurred. . . : An attempted rape occurs when the perpetrator forms an intent 
to rape and takes any action to carry out that intention."); McCrae v. Wainwright, 439 So. 
2d 868, 871 (Fla. 1983) (''The overt act of sexual violation, whether the victim was alive or 
dead, together with the intent inferable from the circumstances, were sufficient to prove the 
crime of attempted rape if in fact the jury believed that the victim was dead."); Common­
wealth v. Tarver, 345 N.E.2d 671 ,  680 (Mass. 1975) ("it is inconsequential whether the 
victim was alive or dead at the time of the sexual molestation, so long as the rape, or at­
tempted rape, and the murder were parts of a continuous transaction."); State v. Knight, 1 1 5  
A. 569, 572 (NJ. 1921) ("an attempt to commit a rape does not begin with the act of pene­
tration, but with the primary attack upon a woman made for the purpose of carrying out the 
intent, and that this intent may be formed at the very moment of the attack. The suggestion 
that, when the victim dies from shock directly resulting from the attack upon her, and the 
death precedes attempted penetration, the party committing the assault does not come within 
the condemnation of the statute, is entirely too unsubstantial to justify extended discussion."). 
1 12. See State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 799 (Ariz. 1992) ("Without question, defendant's 
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murder may be imposed where the victim was killed for sexual grati­
fication, the debate regarding whether the perpetrator may also be con­
victed of rape, rather than only attempted rape, has little practical con­
sequence when sexual contact occurs in the context of a killing. 113 
Moreover, even those jurisdictions that have held that a dead body may 
be raped have limited the rule to instances where the person commit­
ting the sexual intercourse was responsible for the victim's death.1I4 
Consequently, in order to punish acts of necrophilia alone, such as 
those committed at Forest Lawn, it is clear a more specific statute is 
needed. 
2. Abuse of Corpse 
The Model Penal Code has a provision that makes any abuse of a 
corpse a misdemeanor. Section 250.10 of the Model Penal Code pro­
vides: "Except as authorized by law, a person who treats a corpse in a 
way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities commits 
a misdemeanor."1IS The official Comments to the Model Penal Code 
explain that this provision includes, but is not limited to, sexual inter­
course with dead bodies. 1 I6 This approach has the advantage of avoid­
ing piecemeal legislation with regard to various types of corpse dese­
cration. 1I7 
act of necrophilia inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim."); State v. Gallegos, 870 P.2d 
1097, 1 1 1 1  (Ariz. 1994) (same). But see Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78, 84 (Ala. Crirn. 
App. 1995) ("if . . . the jury finds that the appellant did not have the intent to rape the 
victim at the time of the murder, and the sexual intercourse took place after her death, he 
could not be convicted of capital murder, only the lesser included offense of murder."). 
1 13. Some states, however, have drawn a distinction between a killing committed during 
the course of an attempted rape, and sexual intercourse with a corpse, where the intent to 
have intercourse was formed only after the victim was dead. See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 668 
So. 2d 78, 83 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ("An accused is not guilty of a capital offense where 
the intent to commit the accompanying felony, in this case rape, was formed only after the 
victim was killed."). 
1 14. See notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
1 15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1962). 
1 16. See REVISED COMMENT TO MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1 980): 
This phrasing includes sexual indecency but is not so limited. It also reaches phys­
ical abuse, mutilation, gross neglect, or any other sort of outrageous treatment of a 
corpse. The overarching purpose is to protect against outrage to the feelings of 
friends and family of the deceased. For that reason the offense is stated here rather 
than in the article on sexual offenses. 
1 17. See REVISED COMMENT TO MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10  (1980). 
The distinguishing features of the Model Code offense are the generality and com­
prehensiveness with which the proscribed conduct is defined. Section 250.1 0 covers 
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Fourteen states have adopted general abuse of corpse statutes that 
are similar toilS or are closely modeled after the Model Penal 
Code. 119 Legislative commentary in Arkansas!ZO Kentucky 121 and 
Ohiol22 expressly indicates that sexual abuse of a corpse is prohibited. 
any conduct that would "outrage ordinaIy family sensibilities." This formulation is 
sufficiently broad to preclude gaps in coverage and yet sufficiently precise in its 
statement of the ultimate question to provide a meaningful standard of decision. 
[d. The Comment also cites existing statutes which "detail more specifically the kind of con­
duct that may be punished," and remarks: "Even a cumulation of such provisions, however, 
is likely to leave gaps that could be avoided by following the Model Code approach of a 
more generalized statement of the offense." [d. 
1 18. See ARK. Coos ANN. § 5-60-101 (Michie 1987) ("Physically mistreats a corpse in a 
manner offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities"); MONT. Coos ANN. § 44-3-404 
(1995) ("purposely touches, removes, or disturbs a corpse"); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.085 
(1995) ('''abuse of corpse' includes treatment of a corpse by any person in any manner not 
recognized by generally accepted standards of the community"); S.C. Coos ANN. § 16-17-
600 (Law Co-op. 1995) ("desecrate human remains"); TENN. Coos ANN. § 39-17-312 (1996) 
("Physically mistreats a corpse in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinaIy per­
son."); TEx. PEN. Coos ANN
. 
§ 42.08 (West 1997) ("treats in a seriously offensive manner 
a human corpse."); VA. COOS ANN. § 18.2-126 (Michie 1996) ("willfully and intentionally 
physically defiles a dead human body"). 
1 19. See ALA. Coos § 13A-11-13 (1996) ("knowingly treats a human corpse in a way 
that would outrage ordinaIy family sensibilities"); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-13-101 
(West 1997) ("Treats the body or remains of any person in a way that would outrage nor­
mal family sensibilities."); DEL. Coos ANN. tit. 1 1 ,  § 1332 (1996) ("treats a corpse in a 
way that a reasonable person knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities."); HAw. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 71 1-1 108 (Michie 1988) ("treats a human corpse in a way that the 
person knows would outrage ordinaIy family sensibilities."); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.120 
(Banks-Baldwin 1995) ("intentionally treats a corpse in a way that would outrage ordinary 
family sensibilities."); OHIO REv. Coos ANN. § 2927.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) ("treat a 
human corpse in a way that the person knows would outrage reasonable family sensibili­
ties . . .  [or] reasonable community sensibilities."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5510 (West 
1997) ("treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities."). 
120. See Dougan v. State, 912 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Ark. 1995) ("This section is designed 
to cover not only sexual assaults on dead human bodies but also lesser forms of mishan­
dling, abuse, or even neglect.") (quoting Commentary to former ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2920 
(1977» . In Dougan, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the current statute [ARK. Coos 
ANN. § 5-60-101 (Michie 1987)] should be construed in accordance with the Commentary to 
its predecessor statute. I d. 
121.  See Commentary to Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.120 (Banks-Baldwin 1 995): 
The provision prohibits any sort of outrageous treatment of a human corpse. The 
section is included here rather than in the chapter relating to sexual offenses be­
cause it is primarily concerned with outrage to the feelings of surviving kin rather 
than with preventing physical aggression. ·  The prohibition is not limited to sexual 
relations with corpses. It is intended to include any form of sexual contlet, sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, gross neglect or mutilation. 
122. See Commentary to OHIO REv. Coos ANN. § 2927.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (''This 
section . . . .  also includes other kinds of conduct, such as copulating with or otherwise mis­
treating a corpse."). 
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New Mexico punishes indecent treatment of a corpse as a common-law 
crime. III Six other states, including California, have statutes that pro­
hibit "mutilation" of a corpse; 124 however, the Commentary to the 
Model Penal Code strongly suggests that necrophilia does not fall 
within the ordinary defmition of "mutilation,,,llS and as noted above, 
the majority of cases that have defmed the term are in accord.l26 Thir­
teen states have statutes that expressly prohibit acts of necrophilia,l21 
while seventeen statesl28 and the District of Columbia do not have 
any statute that could reasonably be construed to prohibit sexual con­
tact with dead bodies. 
Perhaps because of their relative clarity, abuse of corpse statutes 
appear only infrequently in the case law with respect to acts of necro­
philia.129 As noted above, however, some states have held or suggest-
123. See State v. Hartzler, 433 P.2d 231 ,  235 (N.M. 1967): 
The offense, which was and is punishable at common law, is that of indecency in 
the treatment or handling of a dead human body. That which outrages or shocks 
the public sense of decency and morals, or that which contravenes the established 
and known public standards of decency and morals, relative to the care, treatment 
or disposition of a dead human body, is punishable as an act of indecency. 
See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-3 (Michie 1996) ("In criminal cases where no provision 
of this code is applicable, the common law, as recognized by the United States and the 
several states of the Union, shall govern."). 
124. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-861 (West 1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 7052 (West Supp. 1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 654 (West 1996); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit 17-A, § 508 (West 1996); MICH. COMP; LAws ANN. § 750.160 (West 1996); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-502 (Michie 1996). See also 9 GUAM CoDE ANN. § 61 .50 (1995); 
P.R. LAws ANN. tit 33, § 4221 (1994); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2021 (1995). 
125. In describing early American statutes, the Comment states: "Some of these statutes 
apparently reached only the sorts of misconduct mentioned above [including mutilation], 
while others dealt explicitly with sexual indecency with a corpse." COMMENT TO MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1980). In addition, in describing statutes existing in 1980, the Com­
ment cites California Health & Safety Code § 7052 as prohibiting removal of a body from a· 
grave without authorization and mutilation of a corpse, and concludes: "Even a cumulation of 
such provisions, however, is likely to leave gaps . . . . " [d. 
126. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
127. See infra note 133. 
128. Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hamp­
shire, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Ver­
mont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Five states have a statute that prohibits mutilation of a corpse, but only in limited 
circumstances that would not apply to most acts of necrophilia. See IDAHO CODE § 1 8-
1506A (1996) (mutilation of a human corpse "in the presence of a child as part of a cere­
mony, rite or similar observance"); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/12-33 (West 1996) (same); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-627 (same); NEB. REv. STAT. § 7 1-1006 (1996) (mutilation of a 
body by an officer, agent or employee of the state or any county or municipal subdivision); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.11  (West 1996) (mutilation of a corpse "with intent to conceal a 
crime or to avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime"). 
129. See Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78, 85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ("If the intent to 
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ed that an abuse of corpse statute should not be construed to include 
sexual intercourse with a victim killed by the perpetrator, but that such 
acts should be prosecuted as rape or sodomy.l30 Other states, howev­
er, have reached the opposite conclusion.13I In Kentucky, for exam­
ple, legislative commentary makes it clear that acts of necrophilia are 
punished as abuse of corpse, and not rape.132 
3. Express Statutory Bans 
Thirteen states have s�tutes that expressly prohibit sexual conduct 
with dead bodies.133 Of these states, the history of necrophilia legisla-
have sexual intercourse arose after the victim's death, the crime committed would be abuse 
of corpse.j. 
130. See State v. Whitsell, 591 N.E.2d 265, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990): 
By defining a separate offense with ·a lesser penalty, the legislature obviously in­
tended for the abuse or' a corpse statute . . .  to cover acts that are distinct from 
those which cause the death of the individual. Moreover, the intent or state of 
mind needed to prove an abuse of a corpse is vastly different from that which is 
needed to show felonious sexual penetration. 
See also State v. Collins, 585 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("Even though the vic­
tim died during the incident in the present case, defendant's conduct, when viewed in its 
entirety, involved 'indignities to the living,' unlike the conduct that [Omo REv. CODE § 
2927.01] contemplates.j. e/. State v. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tenn. 1988) (reaching 
the same conclusion without citing Tennessee's abuse of corpse statute). 
131.  Padgett v. State, 668 So. 2d 78, 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that sexual 
intercourse occurring after the victim's death constitutes either abuse of corpse or attempted 
rape, rather than rape); Commonwe8Ith v. Sudler, 436 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Pa. 1981) (holding 
that the enactment of an abuse of corpse statute indicated that "the Legislature intended the 
crime of rape to encompass only indignities to the living."). 
132. See Commentary to Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) ("This 
chapter does not penalize sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with [a] . . .  dead 
human body. . . . If a prosecution for this sort of activity is necessary, it can be brought 
under abuse of a corpse."). See also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 549 (Ky. 
1988) (quoting Commentary to Chapter 510); Smith v. Commonwealth, 722 S.W.2d 892, 
893-94 (Ky. 1987) (paraphrasing Commentary to Chapter 510). 
133. See ALAsKA STAT. § 1 1 .61.130 (Michie 1995) ("A person commits the crime of 
misconduct involving a corpse if . . . the person engages in sexual penetration of a corpse"); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 1994) ("A person is guilty of sexual assault in 
the fourth degree when . . .  such person engages in sexual ,contact with an animal or dead 
body"); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 872.06 (West 1997) ("A person' who mutilates, commits sexual 
abuse upon, or otherwise grossly abuses a dead human body commits a felonyj; GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-6-7 (1995) ("A person commits the offense of necrophilia when he performs any 
sexual act with a dead hUman body involving the sex organs of the one and the mouth, 
anus, penis or vagina of the other."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1 1-2 (West Supp. 1995) ("A 
person who knowingly or intentionally . . . has sexual intercourse or sexual deviate conduct 
with the corpse commits abuse of a corpse"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.18 (West 1997) ("A 
person commits abuse of a ·  human corpse if the person knowingly and intentionally engages 
in a sex act . . .  with a human corpse."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.294 (West 1987) 
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tion in Washington best demonstrates how an inCident similar to the 
Forest Lawn break-in can influence public policy. 
Prior to 1976, Washington had a statute which prohibited sexual 
intercourse with a dead body.134 The Washington law was repealed in 
1976,13S together with laws which made consensual sodomy a 
crime.l36 The current statutel37 was enacted in 1994 as a result of 
public outcry over the case of Ronald Shawn Ryan. 
In State v. Ryan, 138 the defendant broke into the same funeral 
home twice within six days and damaged property, stole items, and 
made sexual contact with several corpses.139 He was convicted of two 
("Whoever carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality"); NEV. 
REv. STAT. § 201.450 (1995) ("A person who commits sexual penettation on the dead body 
of human being shall be punished" by imprisonment or a fme or both); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 
130.20 (McKinney 1994) ("A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when . . .  he engages in 
sexual conduct with an animal or dead human body."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12 
(1995) ("A person who performs a deviate sexual act with the intent to arouse or gratify his 
sexual desire is guilty of a class A misdemeanor."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1 -20-02 (1995) 
('Deviate sexual act' means any form of sexual contact with an animal, bird or dead per­
son."); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.087 (1993) ("A person commits the crime of abuse of corpse 
in the first degree if the person . . .  (e]ngages in sexual activity with a corpse or involving 
a corpse"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-704 (1995) ("A person is guilty of abuse or desecra­
tion of a dead human body if the person intentionally and unlawfully . . .  commits, or at­
tempts to commit upon any dead body sexual penettation or intercourse, object rape, sod­
omy, or object sodomy"); WASH REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.105 (West Supp. 1995) ("Any 
person who has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a dead human body is guilty of a 
class C felony."). 
A Hawaii statute defmes "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any act of sexual gratifica­
tion between a person and an animal or corpse, involving the sex organs of one and the 
mouth, anus, or sex organs of the other." HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (Michie 1996). 
However, the only statute that currently prohibits "deviate sexual intercourse" is Hawaii's 
prostitution statute, which applies only to acts engaged in for a fee. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 712-1200 (Michie 1996). Other acts of necrophilia are now punished under Hawaii's abuse 
of corpse statute. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 711-1 108 (Michie 1996). 
134. Former WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.92.010 (repealed 1976). 
135. Id. 
136. See Hal Spencer, House Bill Would Recrimioolize Sex With Dead, MORNING NEWS 
TRiBUNE (Tacoma), February 10; 1993, . at 85 ("Sexual activity with corpses 'used to be 
illegal, but it was decriminalized along with a whole bunch of sodomy laws' some years 
back") (quoting Rep. Rob Johnson (D-Mount Vernon». 
137. WASH. REv. CODE AJJN. § 9A.44.105 (West Supp. 1995). 
138. 899 P.2d 825 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
139. Id. at 826, The facts of the case were set forth in more detail in an unpublished 
portion of the decision: 
The first time, Ryan smashed a glass section of a door and climbed through the 
opening. He stole several items and caused more than $1,500 damage to pictures, 
furniture, and office equipment. Ryan also made sexual contact with the corpses of 
three elderly women, which are labeled victims I ,  2, and 3 for identification. 
[Footnote omitted]. Victim 1 had been embalmed prior to the burglary. After the 
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counts of second degree burglary and one count of fIrst degree mali­
cious mischief.l40 The court found that the second break-in was sexu­
ally motivated141 and imposed an exceptional sentence of 120 months 
for each burglary count.142 The Washington Court of Appeal upheld 
the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence, despite the de­
fendant's argument that the sentencing court improperly considered his 
sexual contact with the corpses.143 Ryan could not, however, be 
charged with necrophilia because "Ryan's contact with the corpses was 
apparently not a crime at the time he broke into the funeral home."I44 
Shortly after Ryan's initial arrest, a bill was introduced in the state 
legislature making necrophilia illegal. 145 As enacted the following 
burglary, victim 1 had postmonem cuts on her leg and buttock as well as some 
skin slippage. Victim 2 had been completely prepared for a funeral. After the bur­
glary, victim 2 was only partially clothed; her skirt and jacket were unbuttoned and 
left open, and her bra was pulled down. Cotton that had been packed in victim 2's 
vagina for embalming had been removed and postmonem abrasions were evident in 
the crease of her groin. Victim 3, who had been embalmed and left on a gurney, 
was discovered on the floor of the embalming room. A vaginal swab taken from 
victim 3 revealed the presence of sperm. 
Ryan returned to the funeral home 6 days later. He entered by smashing the 
glass section of a different door and stole several items. After the burglary, a 
corpse that had been fully prepared for viewing was found with her underwear at 
the foot of the coffin. The underwear was soiled with feces that had not come 
from the ·  corpse. The medical examiner identified postmonem abrasions on the 
corpse's knee and foot as well as tears in the vaginal wall, which indicated that 
something had been insened into the vagina. A vaginal swab tested positive for the 
presence of sperm. 
Five days later, the funeral home's silent alarm was activated. Police encoun­
tered Ryan outside the funeral home and arrested him, although there was no evi­
dence of a break-in at that time. Ryan confessed to the earlier burglaries but denied 
any sexual activity with the corpses. 
State v. Ryan, Nos. 33607-0-1,  35017-0-1 and 34293 -2- 1 ,  at *827-28 (Wash. Ct App. July 
31,  1995) [hereinafter cited as "unpublished disposition") (on file with the law review office). 
The full opinion was originally published in rpe advance sheets of West's Pacific Reponer, 
but the portion at pages 827-30 was withdrawn from the bound volume. 
140. Ryan, 899 P.2d at 826. ''The trial court ruled that the funeral home, not the corps-
es, was the victim of the burglaries." Id. at *828 n.2 (unpublished decision). 
141. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.127 (West 1995) (defining sexual motivation). 
142. Ryan, 899 P.2d at *828. 
143. Id. at *829. Ryan contended that his sexual contact ·with the corpses constituted the 
additional uncharged crimes of mutilating a corpse and grave robbing. The court assumed 
without deciding that the facts established additional uncharged crimes, but held that their 
admission was not error, because "the close connection between the sexual contact and the 
facts underlying the burglary charges allowed the trial court to consider Ryan's contact with 
the corpses." Id. 
144. Id. at *829 n.5. 
145. See Chuck Shepherd, Man. 22. is Arrested in Funeral Parlor Break-ins, STAR-TRI­
BUNE (Minneapolis-St Paul), Apr. 29, 1993, at 07E. See also Hal Spencer, House Bill Would 
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year, it reads: 
( 1) Any person who has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a 
dead human body is guilty of a class C felony. 
(2) As used in this section: 
(a) "Sexual intercourse" (i) has its ordinary meaning and occurs 
upon any penetration, however slight; and (ii) also means any pene­
tration of the vagina or anus however slight, by an object, when 
committed on a dead human body, except when such penetration is 
accomplished as part of a procedure authorized or required under 
chapter 68.50 RCW or other law; and (iii) also means any act of 
sexual contact between the sex organs of a person and the mouth or 
anus of a dead human body. 
(b) "Sexual contact" means any touching by a person of the sexual 
or other intimate parts of a dead human body done for the purpose 
of gratifying the sexual desires of the person.l46 
The rapid response of the Washington Legislature to the crimes 
committed by the defendant in State v. Ryan demonstrates that public 
revulsion and outrage over acts of necrophilia remains high. Similar 
incidents in other states have provoked similar responses by their legis­
latures.147 By failing to react to the break-in at Forest Lawn (despite 
the coverage given to the incident in newspapers, radio and television), 
the California Legislature may have missed an ideal opportunity to pass 
similar corrective legislation. 
Recriminalize Sex With Dead, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma), Feb. 10, 1993, at B5: 
The burglary of a funeral home in Edmonds last month in which the bodies 
of elderly women were disturbed demonstrates the need to make necrophilia illegal, 
Rep. Rob Johnson said Tuesday. 
. 
Johnson (D-Mount Vernon) said he foresees no opposition to such a measure, 
and he intends to introduce one soon pending a review of draft legislation by state 
prosecutors. . . . 
House Judiciary Chairman Marlin Applewick (D-SeattJe) said the issue arose 
after a funeral home owned by former Republican Rep. John Beck was burglarized 
in January. 
''There was concern that the bodies might have been violated, but when Mr. 
Beck asked what could be done about it, he was told 'nothing.' It isn't against the 
law," Applewick said. "Rob is wi11ing to carry the bill to change that." 
146. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.l05 (West SUpp. 1995). 
147. See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 917 (Nev. 1996) (dissenting opinion): 
The necrophilia statute [NEV. REv. STAT. § 201.450 (1993)] was enacted in Nevada 
as a result of the body of a dead child being stolen from the mortuary and sexual­
ly assaulted by the perpetrator, who thereafter deposited the body in a garbage 
can. . . . The outrage prompting enactment of the statute was specifically designed 
to secure the conviction of individuals who seek out dead bodies for their sexual 
pleasure. 
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Like abuse of corpse statutes, necrophilia statutes have only infre­
quently been the subject of appellate opinions discussing their applica­
bility. The only significant question has been whether a necrophilia 
statute applies when the perpetrator kills his victim before assaulting 
her. As discussed above, the Georgia Supreme Court holds that a killer 
who assaults his victim is guilty of rape, and that the necrophilia stat­
ute applies only to one who "happens upon" a dead body and has sexu­
al intercourse with it. l48 In Doyle v. State;49 however, the Nevada 
Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in reversing the 
defendant's conviction for sexual assault: 
Although Nevada's sexual assault statute provides little guidance in 
this regard, we conclude that the better reasoned interpretation is that 
the legislature intended "person" in the rape statute to mean a living 
human being. We believe that the indignities inflicted upon a corpse, 
although contemptible in their own right, are dis tinguishable from 
those inflicted upon the living, and we further believe that the legis­
lature intended to _ recognize this distinction when it enacted 
Nevada's necrophilia statute with its more flexible sentencing 
guidelines. ISO 
The dissenting opinion in Doyle labeled the necrophilia statute "clearly 
inapplicable," because "the perpetrators in this case, including Doyle, 
were not necrophiles who had perverted . interests in having sexual 
intercourse with corpses."ISI The majority responded: 
We also do not believe that NRS 20 1. 450--which is popularly 
known as the "necrophilia" statute, although that term appears no­
where in the text of the statute-is intended only to apply to medi­
cally classifiable "necrophiles." The plain meaning of the statute is 
to punish' the act of sexual penetration of a dead human body, re­
gardless of motive.IS2 
Of the various state statues that criminalize acts of necrophilia, 
several defme the offense broadly to include all sexual conduct, contact 
or activity; 153 while others are limited to sexual "penetration"IS4 or 
148. Lipham v. State, 364 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1988). See notes 87-90 and accompanying 
text 
149. 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996). 
150. [d. at 914. Accord, Atkins v. State, 923 P.2d 1 1 19, 1 1 22 (Nev. 1996). 
151 .  Doyle, 921 P.2d at 919 (dissenting opinion). 
152. [d. at 914 n.8. 
153. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 1994) ("sexual contact with an 
animal or dead body"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.20 (McKinney 1994) ("sexual conduct with 
an animal or dead human body."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1 -20-02 (1995) ('''Deviate sexual 
act' means any form of sexual contact with an animal, bird or dead person."); OR. REv. 
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attempt to specify the precise acts that are prohibited. ISS The authors 
believe that the former approach is preferable. Attempting to specify 
the acts that are prohibited may result in loopholes. For example, 
Georgia's statute does not appear to prohibit digital penetration of a 
corpse; IS6 while statutes that are limited to penetration would not in­
clude masturbation on the outside of a dead body. 
C. PUNISHMENT 
Currently, the paraphilias that are legislatively-defmed sex offens­
es, such as necrophilia, are predominantly treated with penal incarcera­
tion.IS7 The defendant in State v. Ryan,ISS for example, was sen­
tenced to incarceration for ten years, tS9 and ordered to pay restitution 
of more than $19,000.160 On appeal, Ryan's sentence was affmned, 
STAT. § 166.087 (1993) ("sexual activity with a corpse or involving a corpse"). 
154. See ALAsKA STAT. § 1 1 .61.130 (Michie 1995) ("sexual penetration of a corpse"); 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 201 .450 (1995) ("sexual penetration on the dead body of a human be­
ing); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-704 (1995) ("sexual penetration or intercourse, object rape, 
sodomy, or object sodomy"). 
ISS. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.06 (West 1(97) (deflDing "sexual abuse"); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-6-7 (1995); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9A.44.l05 (West Supp. 1995) (defining 
"sexual intercourse"). Although Washington also prohibits "sexual contact," that term is de­
fmed as "touching by a person of the sexual or other intimate parts of a dead human body 
done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of the person." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.l05(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995). In order for the word "intimate" not to be redundant, 
it must be construed to limit the parts of the body with which contact is prohibited. 
156. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7 (1995) ("A person commits the offense of necrophilia 
when he performs any sexual act with a dead human body involving the sex organs of the 
one and the mouth, anus, penis or vagina of the other."). 
[d. 
157. See MONEY, supra note 13, at 450-5 1.  
The rationale for defining paraphilias as crimes instead of illnesses derives from the 
philosophy of the Inquisition and demon possession, for which offenders were 
burned at the stake. Degeneracy [where attributed to the influence of pornogra­
phy] . . . allows the paraphilic offender to be held responsible for his condition, 
and for his offense, since he is held to be responsible for having exposed himself 
to the explicit sexual depictions of pornography. In consequence, punishment as a 
treatment is held justified . 
. . . Despite the lack of outcome studies, castration treatment [suggested] that sex 
offenders might be treated by other than penal methods. Drug treatments have also 
been attempted with varying results, including eliminating the tyrannical, addictive 
quality of the paraphilic fantasy. 
158. 899 P.2d 825 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
159. [d. at *828, (unpublished disposition). This portion of the decision was withdrawn 
from the bound volume. See supra note 139. 
160. [d. at 826. 
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despite its exceptional length, because Ryan's  funeral-home burglaries 
were sexually motivated,161 but the restitution order was reduced to 
less than $9,000 because of a procedural error.162 
In states in which acts of necrophilia are not specifically prohibit­
ed, Washington's approach of permitting an enhanced sentence for 
other crimes committed during the necrophilic incident is appropri­
ate.163 In crafting necrophilia statutes, however, California and other 
states without existing provisions should consider appropriate sentenc­
ing at the outset to avoid any perception of bias in the imposition of 
exceptional sentences in the future. 
The Model Penal Code treats abuse of corpse as a misdemean­
or.l64 The official Comment explains that "[g]reater penalties seem 
plainly excessive in light of the fact that the . harm involved is only 
outrage to sensibility."I65 Of the fourteen states that have general 
abuse of corpse statutes, eight follow the recommendation of the Model 
Penal Code,l66 while six impose felony punishment. 167 The states 
that specifically prohibit necrophilia are also split: eight punish necro­
philia as a felony,l68 while five treat it as a misdemeanor.l69 In those 
states that treat the offense as a felony, punishment can be quite severe; 
both Georgia and South Carolina require prison terms of not less than 
one year and not more than ten years,170 while Nevada provides pun­
ishment ranging from a $20,000 fme to a life sentence with the possi-
161. [d. at *829-30 (unpublished disposition) ("We fmd it difficult to believe that the 
Legislature anticipated the crime of second degree burglary to include breaking into a funeral 
horne and stealing objects, destroying property, and committing sexual acts with corpses. 
These circumstances certainly distinguish Ryan's crimes from other second degree burglar­
ies."). 
162. [d. at 827. The funeral horne had sought to recover its attorneys fees relating to 
Ryan's criminal prosecution, civil actions brought against the funeral horne after his arrest, 
and media coverage of his crimes. [d. at 826. Ryan objected to the amount of fees for the 
latter two categories, and his objection was sustained on appeal because the order was en­
tered after the deadline established by statute. [d. at 827. 
163. In Washington, "the sentencing court may go outside the presumptive range 
when . . . it fmds that substantial and compelling reasons exist to justify an exCeptional 
sentence." [d. at *829 (unpublished decision) (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.120(2) 
(1995». 
164. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250. 10. 
165. [d. 
I 166. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
167. Arkansas, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
168. Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 
169. Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota. 
170. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-600 (Law Co-op. 
1995). 
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bility of parole after five years. 171 
[Vol. 18 
If necrophilia is a blatant psychosis, as suggested by some ex­
perts,172 then perhaps the sanity of the defendant accused of engaging 
in acts of necrophilia should be taken into consideration when deter­
mining both guilt and an appropriate sentence.173 
IV. EVIDENTIARY USE OF NECROPHILIA 
The principal evidentiary issue involving necrophilia is whether it 
is error to identify the defendant in a criminal case as a necrophile, or 
to introduce evidence of the defendant's commission of acts of necro­
philia, when sexual contact with a dead body does not constitute an 
essential element of the crimes charged. 
To be admissible, evidence of necrophilia must be relevant to a 
material fact.I:4 Evidence that is not relevant to a material fact is not 
admissible.17S · In West v. State,176 for example, the Mississippi Su­
preme Court held that it was error to permit the prosecution's  expert 
witness to introduce "a free floating lecture on a psychosexual disorder 
he labeled necrophilia."m In West, Dr. Galvez was called to testify 
concerning his autopsy of the victim, and to establish that the victim 
had been sexually assaulted. The prosecution then asked Dr. Galvez 
"whether or not there is a term for people who seek out or enjoy sex 
with people that are dead."17s After a defense objection was over­
ruled, Dr. Galvez was permitted to describe mild and severe forms of 
necrophilia, and to explain that "the desire to control" was character-
171. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 201 .450 (1995). 
172. See note 17 and accompanying text. 
173. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all potential defenses to necrophilia, 
including the insanity defense and the policy issues raised by its use. Nevertheless, insanity 
as a potential defense should be considered as another necessary hurdle to jump when prose­
cuting defendants accused of sexually assaulting corpses. Cf, People v. Clark, 3 Cal. 4th 41,  
153, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 617, 833 P.2d 561,  624 (1992) (evidence that defendant suffered 
from necrophilia "did not prevent him from understanding what he was doing; he intended 
to commit the killings, and he knew that killing was wrong."); Robinson v. State, 238 A.2d 
875, 889-90 (Md. 1968) (evidence that defendant suffered from necrophilia did not establish 
insanity under the M'Naghten test). 
174. FED. R. EVID. 402; CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1995). Throughout this section, 
the authors have cited to both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence 
Code. Most states have adopted one or the other as a model for their own evidentiary rules. 
175. FED. R. EVID. 402; CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1995). 
176. 553 So. 2d 8 (Miss. 1989). 
177. [d. at 10. 
178. [d. at 14. 
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istic of both necrophilia and other forms of sexual assault.1 79 On ap­
peal, the court held that the testimony was inadmissible on two 
grounds. First, the court held that the prosecution had "violated its duty 
to provide West pre-trial discovery of Dr. Galvez' necrophilia theo­
ry,,,180 and that this violation was not cured by granting the defense a 
half-day recess before cross-examining Dr. Galvez: 
Precisely because the prosecution's necrophilia theory was so central 
to the question whether West could be exposed to the death penalty, 
a day's break in the ac tion was an inadequate antidote for the 
prosecution's discovery violation. This is the sort of prosecution 
theory which, had the defense known of it prior to trial, may well 
have altered the entire defense strategy. It is the sort of theory which 
would no doubt have sent the experts scurrying to the books for 
study and reflection. With all else that must of necessity be consid­
ered in a capital murder trial, unreality attends any suggestion that 
defense counsel can stop in midstream and become sufficiently in­
formed on a subject like necrophil ia to cross-examine with compe­
tence.181 
Second, the court held that the testimony was inadmissible in the ab­
sence of testimony that West was suffering from necrophilia and that 
the disorder reasonably explained or produced his behavior.182 The 
court explained that "evidence which only describes the characteristics 
of the. typical offender has no relevance to whether the defendant com­
mitted the crime in question.,,183 
Evidence that is otherwise relevant "may be excluded if its proba­
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . .  ." 184 Where the de­
fendant is not (or cannot be) charged with committing specific acts of 
necrophilia, it seems apparent that identifying a criminal defendant as a 
necrophile may create a risk of unfair prejudice against the defendant 
in the minds of the jury. The disgust and outrage that society feels 
against those who desecrate corpses and against sexual offenders in 
general combine to create a particular repugnance for those accused of 
necrophilia.18s It is not difficult to imagine that evidence of such acts 
179. Id. at 14-15. 
180. Id. at 17. 
181 .  Id. at 19. 
182. Id. at 20-21. 
183. Id. at 21 (quoting State v. Clements, 770 P.2d 447, 454 (Kan. 1989». 
184. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995). 
185. See, e.g., Locke v. State, 501 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (dissenting 
opinion) ("I personally consider [necrophilia) the most loathsome, degrading and vile sexual 
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may cause the jury to decide the case on an emotional basis rather than 
a rational one.l86 
In one case, however, the California Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that identifying the defendant in a rape case as a necrophile . 
was prejudicial error. In People v. Kemp,187 the defendant was con­
victed of the murder of one victim, the rape and kidnaping of a second 
victim, and the rape of a third victim and was sentenced to death.188 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court considered whether it was 
error to admit the opinion testimony of the State's expert that "I be­
lieve that the man does enjoy sexual relations with a dead person[,] 
necrophilia as we term it.,,189 The Court concluded that where the 
expert's testimony was not deliberately elicited by the prosecution, but 
came in as a natural response to a question concerning the defendant's 
ability to form the requisite intent, and was not objected to by the 
defendant's counsel at trial, allowing the statement to remain in the 
record was not prejudicial error:90 The court's rationale, however, left 
open the possibility that admission of such a statement would be preju­
dicial error if it was objected to at trial or if it was deliberately elicited 
by the prosecution or unduly emphasized in argument. 
In weighing the probative value of such evidence against its preju­
dicial effect, however, one must consider the more specific mandate of 
Rule 404(b) or similar state rules:91 Federal Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . 192 
This subsection "has emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the 
activity imaginable. . . . [It is] so horrible as to be repugnant to all but the most de­
praved."). 
186. See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Evm. 403 (defining unfair prejudice as 
"an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not neces­
sarily, an emotional one."). 
187. 55 Cal. 2d 458, 1 1  Cal. Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913 (1961). 
188. [d. at 462, I l  Cal. Rptr. at 362, 359 P.2d at 914. . 
189. [d. at 473, 1 1  Cal. Rptr. at 369, 359 P.2d at 921. 
190. [d. 
191.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); CAL. EViD. CODE § I lOl(b) (West 19-); see also Advi­
sory Committee Note to FED. R. EViD. 403 ("The rules which follow in this Article are con­
crete applications evolved for particular situations. However, they reflect the policies underly­
ing the present rule, which is designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which 
no specific rules have been formulated."). 
192. FED. R. EViD. 404(b). 
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Rules of Evidence."193 It is also one of the most controversial. Many 
commentators have pointed out that although Rule 404(b) prohibits the 
use of evidence of an accused's general propensity, the use of other 
acts .to prove identity or intent often comprises nothing more than evi­
dence of a highly specific and/or unusual propensity on the part of the 
accused. 194 
Under Section 404(b) , evidence of necrophilic acts on the part of 
the accused typically will be offered to show the accused's intent or 
motive to kill (in order to carry out a necrophilic fantasy). For exam­
ple, evidence that the accused had intercourse with the victim imme-
. diately after the killing might tend to show a motive for the killing, 
which could in tum support a fmding of premeditation.19s Such an 
inference would not be improper under Rule 404(b), because it con­
cerns conduct directed toward the specific victim rather than the 
accused's general propensity to commit such acts. 
Evidence of other crimes may also be admitted to rebut the 
defendant's claim that he or she was an unwilling participant in the 
charged crimes.l96 In State v. Walters,l97 for example, the defendant 
193. Advisory Committee's Note to 1991 Amendment of FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
194. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Un­
charged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Char­
acter Prohibition, 51 OIDO ST. LJ. 575 (1990); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character 
to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 
(1982); Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts 
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REv. 777 (1981). 
195. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Ky. 1990) (evidence that dead 
woman's body was subjected to sexual intercourse after she died supported rmding that de­
fendant intended to rape victim); cf. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708-09 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (evidence that defendant had homosexual relationship with nine-year-old boy after 
kidnapping admissible to prove motive). But see United States v. Anderson, 36 MJ. 963, 
978, 981 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993) (accused's statement that he attempted to have intercourse with 
his wife either immediately before, during or immediately after he killed her had no proba­
tive value to charge of murder under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b». The court in Anderson held that 
the admission of the statement was an abuse of discretion, but it concluded that the error 
was harmless under the circumstances, because "it proved little more than was suggested by 
the state of the victim's attire when she was discovered." [d. at 981 .  However, if one as­
sumes that the victim's attire and the statement both tended to prove the accused's intent to 
have intercourse, it is difficult to understand why the court concluded that the former was 
admissible but the latter was nol 
196. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 ,  1335-37 (9th Cir. 1977) (evidence 
of subsequent crimes committed by accused admissible to prove voluntary participation in 
bank robbery and to negate anticipated defense of duress); if. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.23, at 282 (1995) (evidence of other crimes admis­
sible to prove accused's predisposition to rebut a defense of entrapment). This use of other 
crimes evidence may be analogized to using other crimes to prove "absence of mistake or 
accident" which is one of the permissible purposes listed in the Rule. See FED. R. EVID. 
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was charged with two counts of murder in which one victim's body 
was repeatedly sexually molested.198 The prosecution offered evidence 
that the accused had participated in another murder in a different state 
in which the victim's body had been sexually molested.l99 On appeal, 
the court held that evidence of the second murder and associated acts 
of necrophilia was admissible: 
In both the Powe murder and the N. and Phill ips murders, the vic­
tims were abducted; they were taken by automobile to wooded areas; 
there was sexual activity with the victims; the victims were killed; 
there was sexual activ ity with the dead bodies; and the bodies were 
disposed of. . . . Presence and participation in the later Powe murder 
certainly have a bearing on Walters' innocent explanations of her 
presence and partic ipation at the earlier killings. The probative value 
of this ev idence, to show Walters' continuing assoc iation and partici­
pation with Willie as it relates to intent, certainly outwe ighs its con­
cededly prejudicial effect.200 
Similarly, evidence that the accused committed other crimes that share 
a highly distinctive similarity with the crimes at issue ("modus operan­
di") may also be admissible to prove identity.201 When used for this 
purpose, however, the other crimes must have been committed in such 
a distinctive manner as to demonstrate a high probability that the same 
person must have committed both sets of crimes.202 
At common law, evidence of other crimes also could be admitted 
if they were part of the "res gestae," that is, if they were part of the 
series of events for which the defendant was being charged.203 An il-
404(b). 
197. 514 So. 2d 257 (La. CL App. 1 987). 
198. [d. at 260-61 .  The victim was an eight-year old girl that was sexually abused for 
several hours before she was killed. After her death, she was raped anally by Willie, the 
accused's lover. [d. at 260. Another companion, Phillips, then had sexual intercourse with the 
body. [d. Willie then killed Phillips in a quarrel, and Willie and Walters disposed of his 
body. [d. at 261. Finally, before disposing of the eight-year-old's body, "Walters lay across 
the body and watched while Willie raped the body." [d. 
199 . [d. at 261-62 ("Willie killed the hitchhiker with a hammer and had anal intercourse 
with the dead body. Then Walters had sexual intercourse with the body. They [then] had 
sexual intercourse with each other lying on the body."). 
200. [d. at 266. 
201. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 196, § 4.22, at 278-79. 
202. [d.; see also McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (4th ed. 1992) (''The pattern and 
characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature."). 
203. See MCCORMICK, supra note 202, § 190 (other crimes evidence may be admitted 
"[t]o complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and 
nearly contemporaneous happenings."). The McCormick treatise cautions, however, that "[t]his 
rationale should be applied only when reference to other crimes is essential to a coherent 
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lustration of this principle is found in State v. Schmidt,204 in which 
the defendant was convicted of the murder of his stepdaughter. The 
young victim was asleep in bed with her mother when the defendant 
fatally struck her with an axe. The defendant then carried the dead girl 
into an adjacent room and placed her on a bed, where, in the words of 
the court, "an act abhorrent and unthinkable was committed by defen­
dant.,,20s On appeal, the defendant objected to the admission of evi­
dence that he had confessed to having intercourse with the girl's body, 
arguing that proof of a separate, uncharged crime was irrelevant to the 
charge of murder.206 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the con­
fession was admissible, on the ground that the act of intercourse was so 
closely connected and linked to the murder as to form a component 
part of the killing.2JT/ The court also noted that it was a mistake to say 
that a "crime" separate and distinct from the murder was committed by 
the defendant because "[s]exual intercourse with the dead body of a 
human being, however shocking it may be, had not been made a 
crime."208 
The result in Schmidt is consistent with the analysis that would 
occur under Federal Rule 404(b). Evidence of other crimes may be 
admitted if they are "inextricably intertwined" with the crimes for 
which the accused is on trial, or if necessary to provide background or 
context for the charged crimes.209 Because Rule 404(b) encompasses 
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts," however, whether the un­
charged misconduct actually constitutes a crime is unimportant; the 
question is whether the evidence poses the risk of unfair prejudice 
against the accused.2lD 
The most difficult situation occurs when the prosecution seeks to 
and intelligible description of the offense at bar."). [d. 
204. 1 1 2  So. 400 (La. 1927). The statement of facts that follows is adapted from the 
opinion of the court. [d. at 400-01. 
205. [d. at 400. 
206. [d. at 401 .  
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
209. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 196, § 4.20, at 260-61, § 4.23, at 281-
82; if. United States v. Anderson, 36 M.1. 963, 982 (A.F.C.M.R. 1 993) (holding that limiting 
instruction was not required "because the uncharged misconduct is part of the chain of 
events that leads to the consummation of the crime charged or is part and parceL") (con­
struing Mil. R. Evid. 404(b». 
210. See Anderson, 36 M.1. at 979 (holding that the legality of necrophilia was not dis­
positive because "the uncharged misconduct rule is not limited to crimes but also includes 
evidence of other acts, apparently without regard to whether they were criminal or merely 
reprehensible.") (construing Mil. R. Evid. 404(b». 
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introduce evidence of the accused's general necrophilic tendencies. In 
such a case, the opposing directives of Rule 404(b) are seemingly irre­
concilable. On the one hand, evidence of the accused's general propen­
sity toward necrophilia is inadmissible to prove action in conformity 
therewith. On the other hand, evidence of the accused's propensity 
toward necrophilia is highly relevant to prove motive, which is listed as 
a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b). 
People v. ClarJ(-1 I illustrates the inherent tension in Rule 404(b). 
In Clark, the defendant was convicted of the murder of six prostitutes. 
On appeal, he objected to the admission of evidence of his statement 
that "he had found a new 'sexual high' in slitting prostitutes throats 
while engaged in sex, so he could feel their vaginas tighten as they 
died.,,212 The California Supreme Court held that the statement was 
admissible because the defendant had failed to make a timely and spe­
cific objectioq to the testimony. 213 The Court then added: 
In any event, the testimony was admissible under Evidence Code 
section 1 10 1, subdivision (b), as evidence of motive. Evidence of 
motive was relevant to the disputed issue of identity. 
The murder victims were all prostitutes and, with the exception 
of Karen Jones, all were found nude, suggesting a sexual motivation. 
The killer apparently engaged in deviant sexual practices, telling 
Mindy Cohen he had post mortem sex with Marano and Chandler, 
and threatening to kill Cohen and then "make love" to her in the 
same way. Other evidence supported the theory that post mortem sex 
had taken place in some of the murders. . . . The killer achieved 
additional sexual gratification from describing his necrophilic acts to 
Cohen over the telephone. Evidence of defendant's sexual interest in 
and gratification from necrophilic activities and fantasies constituted 
a highly distinctive mark of commonality with the killer . . . .  
. . . The testimony was highly probative. The description of slitting 
the throats of prostitutes was presented as a statement of defendant's 
interests. There was no claim it described an actual killing. There 
was no abuse of discretion.214 
If any of the murders in Clark had been committed in the manner de­
scribed in Clark's statement, the statement certainly would have been 
admissible, either as a confession to one of the charged murders, or at 
least as evidence of a modus operandi so similar that identity could be 
21 1 .  3 Cal. 4th 41 ,  10  Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 833 P.2d 561 (1992). 
212. 1d. at 125, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599, 833 P.2d at 606. 
213. Id. at 125-26, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599, 833 P.2d at 606. 
214. 1d. at 127, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600, 833 P.2d at 607. 
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inferred. The difficulty with the court's reasoning in Clark is the sug­
gestion that the statement was admissible because "[t]here was no 
claim it described an actual killing.,,215 If so, then the probative value 
of the statement rested solely on the argument that Clark had a pro­
pensity for killing and necrophilia. Since the statement was highly 
prejudicial whether or not it was true, under a strict reading of section 
1 101(b), the statement would have been inadmissible.216 However, 
courts have consistently given Rule 404(b) and similar state rules a 
more permissive reading in cases involving deviant sexual behav­
ior.217 
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of applying Rule 404(b) in such 
cases, in 1994 Congress enacted Federal Rules 413,218 41 4,219 and 
415,220 which make prior acts of sexual assault and child molestation 
admissible in both criminal and civil cases involving those offens­
es.221 "Sexual assault" is defined to include: 
,(I) any conduct proscribed by chapter I09A of title 18, United States Code; 
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's 
215. Id. 
216. Cf. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 196, § 4.22, at 274 n.6 ("A distinction 
must be drawn between using evidence of sexual desire to prove motive, where motive is an 
issue, and using evidence of 'lustful disposition' to prove conduct in accordance with that 
disposition, a usage prohibited by PRE 404(b)."). 
217. See MCCORMICK, supra note 202, § 190 ("In some jurisdictions, [evidence of other 
crimes is admissible] to show a passion or propensity for abnormal sexual relations. Initially, 
proof of other sex crimes was always confined to offenses involving the same parties, but a 
number of jurisdictions now admit other sex offenses with other persons, at least as to of­
fenses involving sexual aberrations."); David J. Kaloyanides, Note, The Depraved Sexual 
Instinct Theory: An Example of Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evi­
dence 404(b), 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1297 (1992); M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Oth­
er Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 325, 332-36 (1956). 
218. See FED. R. EVID. 413(a) ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of 
an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or 
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter 
to which it is relevant"). 
219. See FED. R. EVID. 414(a) ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of 
an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense 
or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any 
matter to which it is relevant."). 
220. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a) ("In a civil > case in which a claim for damages or other 
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of 
sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or 
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as pro­
vided in Rule 413 or Rule 414 of these Rules."). 
221. Some states have enacted similar rules. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1 108 (West 
Supp. 1997). 
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body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person; 
( 3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the 
defendant and any part of another person's body; 
( 4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of 
death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or 
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in para­
graphs ( 1)_( 4).222 
It is unclear whether acts of necrophilia would fall within this defmi­
tion. Although most courts have interpreted "person " to mean a living 
person,223 the phrase "another person's body " in paragraph (3) could 
be interpreted to include a dead body. 
v. CONCLUSION 
While the concept of necrophilia may be difficult for the larger 
part of society to comprehend, the offensive nature of the behavior is 
easily grasped, especially when the victim of the necrophilic act is a 
deceased family member, friend, or acquaintance. Suggesting that indi­
viduals who engage in acts of necrophilia are typically afflicted with 
mental disorders hardly brings relief to society or grieving family 
members. It is therefore important that action be taken to criminalize 
necrophilia. 
Although there is dicta in two California cases suggesting that 
necrophilia may be punished under the existing provision for "mutila­
tion " of a corpse, other authority strongly suggests that sexual violation 
of a corpse does not fall within the ordinary defmition of "mutila­
tion.,,224 Since there is serious doubt whether the existing statute 
makes necrophilia a criminal offense, the Legislature should clarify the 
law, either by amending Health & Safety Code section 7052 or by 
adding a new section to the Penal Code. 
On January 4, 1996, less than four months after the break-in at 
Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 225 a bill was introduced in the California 
Assembly to criminalize acts of necrophilia.226 The bill proposed add­
ing a new section to the California Penal Code that would read: 
222. FED. R. EVID. 413(d). 
223. See notes 68-93 and accompanying text 
224. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
225. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
226. A.B. 1992, Cal. Assemb. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1996) (available in WESTLAW, CA­
BILLS database). The bill was introduced by Assembly Member Juanita McDonald (D-Car­
son). [d. 
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1997] NECROPHILIA AND THE LAW 
A person who engages in sexual activity, as defmed in subdivision 
(d) of Section 289.6, with a corpse is gUilty of a felony and shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed . one 
year.227 
577 
The bill was referred to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, but 
a hearing scheduled for April 9, 1996, was canceled, and the bill was 
not enacted.228 
The defmition of "sexual activity " incorporated by reference in the 
proposed statute includes sexual intercourse, sodomy,229 oral copula­
tion,230 and "[p]enetration, however, slight, of the genital or anal 
openings of another person by a foreign object, substance, instrument, 
or device, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or 
abuse.,,231 This defmition, however, would not appear to include sexu­
al contact that does not involve the genitals, mouth or anus of the 
corpse, such as masturbation on another part of the dead body. The 
authors believe that a more comprehensive defmition prohibiting all 
sexual contact is warranted.232 
The maximum punishment provided by the proposed statute is the 
same as that imposed for consensual sexual activity with a minor.233 
It is less severe, however, than the punishment imposed for mutilation 
or disinterment of a corpse. The latter offense is a fe1ony,23 4 and 
where punishment is not otherwise specified, the default punishment 
for felonies is imprisonment for 16  months, or two or three years.23S 
227. Id. § 1 (setting forth text of proposed CAL. PENAL CODE § 287). 
228. Id. (California Bill Tracking Summary) (available in WESlLAW, CA-BILLS data­
base). 
229. Sodomy is dermed as "sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of 
one person and the anus of another person. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is suffi­
cient to cOmplete the crime of sodomy." CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(a) (West Supp. 1997). 
230. Oral copulation is defined as "the act of copulating the mouth of one person with 
the sexual organ or anus of another person." CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(a). 
231 .  CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6 (West Supp. 1997). 
232. See notes 153-156 and accompanying text. 
233. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 .5(c) (West Supp. 1997) (unlawful sexual intercourse 
with a minor more than three years younger than the perpetrator); § 286(b)(1) (West Supp. 
1997) (sodomy); § 288a(b)(I) (West. Supp. 1997) (oral copulation); § 289(h) (West Supp. 
1997) (penetration by unknown object). If the perpetrator is over age 21 and the victim is 
under age 16, the maximum punishment is increased. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 .5(d) 
(West Supp. 1997) (four years); § 286(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (felony); § 288a(b)(2) (West. 
Supp. 1997) (felony); § 289(i) (West Supp. 1997) (felony). The default punishment for a 
felony is a maximum of three years. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 1988). See note 235, 
infra. 
234. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West Supp. 1997). 
235. Section 18 of the Penal Code provides: 
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The authors believe that it is inappropriate to provide a lesser punish­
ment for necrophilia. Sexual activity with a corpse is at least as offen­
sive to the family and to the community as is mutilation or disin­
terment. 
In light of this analysis, the authors propose the following alterna-
tive statute: 
A person who engages or attempts to engage in sexual contact with 
a corpse is guilty of a felony. For the purposes of this section, "sex­
ual contact" is defined to include any physical contact committed for 
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. 
The break-in at Forest Lawn Memorial Park, despite its offensive 
nature, may have provided the California Legislature with an excellent 
opportunity to enact legislation outlawing necrophilia. Because our 
society is generally outraged by the notion of sexual contact with dead 
bodies, the Legislature should take advantage of the opportunity before 
more individuals engage in the legal defilement of human remains. 
Except in cases where a different punisiunent is prescribed by any law of this state, 
every offense declared to be a felony, or to be punishable by imprisonment in a 
state prison, is punishable by imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 1 6  
months, or two or three years; provided, however, every offense which is prescribed 
by any law of the state to be a felony punishable by imprisonment in any of the 
state prisons or by a fine, but without an alternate sentence to the county jail, may 
be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or by a 
fme, or by both. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 1988). It is unclear whether the proviso is limited to felonies 
which provide a fme as alternative punisiunent, or whether it provides a county jail alterna­
tive for all felonies where such an alternative is not otherwise provided, including those that 
are punishable by a fine. In 1956, however, the Attorney General declared that the former 
interpretation was correct. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 279 ( 1956). Since the Attorney General's opin­
ion came only three years after the proviso was added to the statute, see Historical Note to 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 1988), it should be considered authoritative. The Attorney 
General's construction is also supported by the 1957 amendment to the statute, which 
amended the former second paragraph to read, "[t]his section shall not be construed to apply 
to . • • any offense which is prescribed by any law of this State to be a felony punishable 
by imprisonment in any of the state prisons, but without alternative of fme." Historical Note 
to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1 8  (West 1988). Since the Attorney General's interpretation preceded 
the enactment of the 1957 amendment, the subsequent deletion of the entire second para­
graph in 1976 should not be construed to change the meaning of the proviso. 
